Offensive expression and the workplace by Pearson, Megan
	 1	
Offensive	Expression	and	the	Workplace	
	MEGAN	PEARSON*		ABSTRACT	In	this	article	I	argue	that	freedom	of	expression	is	an	important	right	even	within	the	employment	 context.	 I	 contend	 that	 there	 should	 be	 a	 presumption	 in	 favour	 of	 free	expression	 even	 if	 the	 expression	 is	 offensive,	 particularly	 if	 it	 involves	 a	 matter	 of	public	debate.	However,	the	interests	of	colleagues	and	employers	should	be	taken	into	account	 and	may	 be	 decisive.	Where	 expression	 takes	 place	 outside	work,	 employees	should	 only	 be	 subject	 to	 disciplinary	 action	 if	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 link	 between	 their	employment	 and	 the	 expression.	 I	 consider	 the	 law	 relating	 to	 these	 issues	 in	 the	contexts	of	harassment,	unfair	dismissal	and	discrimination	on	the	grounds	of	religion	and	belief.			
1.	INTRODUCTION		Given	the	diversity	of	opinions	existing	in	a	pluralist	society	on	almost	any	subject,	it	is	likely	 that	 conversations	 in	 the	workplace	may	 turn	 to	 controversial	matters	 and	 that	employees	 may	 sometimes	 express	 their	 views	 in	 a	 way	 which	 their	 colleagues	 find	highly	offensive.	Some	employees	may	also	see	it	as	their	religious	duty	to	proselytise	in	the	 workplace	 or	 wish	 to	 persuade	 others	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 their	 political	 views.	 Such	speech	 may	 be	 perceived	 by	 colleagues	 as	 irritating	 at	 best	 and	 as	 offensive,	 even	degrading,	 at	 worst.	 Some	 employers	 may	 also	 wish	 to	 control	 expression	 by	 their	employees	which	takes	place	outside	work,	on	the	grounds	that	it	affects	the	employer’s	trust	in	an	employee’s	abilities,	leads	to	workplace	disharmony	or	affects	an	employer’s																																																									*	PhD	Candidate	in	Law,	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	m.r.pearson@lse.ac.uk.		
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reputation.	 An	 employee’s	 freedom	 of	 expression	 may	 therefore	 be	 infringed	 for	numerous	reasons,	 raising	complex	 issues	as	 to	how	to	protect	 this	right	whilst	giving	due	consideration	to	the	rights	and	interests	of	others.		
2.	THE	IMPORTANCE	OF	FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION			As	 is	 well	 known,	 in	Handyside	 v	 UK	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 	 (ECtHR)	stated	that,	‘freedom	of	expression...is	applicable	not	only	to	'information'	or	'ideas'	that	are	 favourably	 received	 or	 regarded	 as	 inoffensive	 or	 as	 a	matter	 of	 indifference,	 but	also	to	those	that	offend,	shock	or	disturb’.1	Simply	because	expression	takes	place	in	a	work	 context	 does	 not	mean	 that	 this	maxim	 should	 be	 ignored.	Work	 life	 is	 usually	significant	 to	 an	 individual,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 time	 and	 in	 its	 importance	 to	 a	 person’s	sense	 of	 identity.	 Furthermore	 colleagues	 may	 make	 up	 a	 substantial	 proportion	 of	those	with	whom	a	person	regularly	interacts.	Like	any	expression,	expression	at	work	may	therefore	be	important	for	an	individual’s	self-development	or	sense	of	autonomy.	2	This	may	be	especially	true	for	expression	relating	to	political	or	religious	views,	which	may	 be	 extremely	 important	 to	 a	 person’s	 sense	 of	 identity,	 but	 which	 may	 be	particularly	controversial.	Workplace	expression	 is	also	 important	 from	the	perspective	of	broader	society.	The	 classic,	 although	 problematic,	 argument	 for	 freedom	 of	 speech	 is	 that	 of	 the	‘marketplace	of	ideas’:	the	argument	that	through	unfettered	free	speech	the	truth	will	emerge,3	although	 experience	 certainly	 does	 not	 necessarily	 demonstrate	 the	 truth	 of	this	 idea.4	This	 argument	 is	 linked	 to	 perhaps	 a	more	 persuasive	 one,	 which	 Barendt	
																																																								1	(1979-80)	1	EHRR	737,	754.	Although	this	maxim	is	not	necessarily	always	complied	with,	as	the	Court’s	conclusion	in	the	case	in	fact	demonstrates.	2	L.	Vickers,	Freedom	of	Speech	and	Employment	(Oxford:	OUP,	2002)	17.	3	This	idea	is	particularly	associated	with	John	Milton	and	John	Stuart	Mill.	4	See	eg	A.I.	Goldman,	Knowledge	in	a	Social	World	(Oxford:	OUP,	1999)	Ch	7.	
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refers	 to	 as	 ‘the	 argument	 from	 citizen	 participation	 in	 a	 democracy’.5	This	 argument	holds	that	free	expression	is	required	in	order	to	hold	governments	to	account	and	for	individuals	to	contribute	to	political	decisions.		A	workplace	is	a	‘logical’	place	for	discussion	about	political	and	social	matters.6	In	comparison	to	many	other	places	where	people	meet,	it	may	be	more	diverse	in	terms	of	political	 and	 religious	 views,	 age	 and	 other	 characteristics.	 Participation	 in	workplace	discussions	 may	 also	 provide	 greater	 exposure	 to	 differing	 ideas	 than	 more	 formal	methods	for	receiving	 information	such	as	the	media.	This	 is	particularly	so	given	that	use	of	the	media	is	subject	to	a	confirmation	bias.	Empirical	research	has	demonstrated	that	 people	 tend	 not	 only	 to	 choose	 print	 or	 online	media	 that	 agree	 with	 their	 pre-existing	views,	but	also	choose	to	read	those	news	stories	that	do	so	too.7	To	point	out	the	 value	 of	 workplace	 expression	 on	 social	 or	 political	 issues	 is	 not	 to	 overly	romanticise	it:	evidently	expression	may	be	ill-informed	or	bad-tempered,	and	may	not	be	welcomed	by	those	to	whom	it	is	addressed.	This	situation	is	though	hardly	unique	to	the	employment	context.		The	presumption	in	favour	of	free	expression	is	even	stronger	where	an	employer	seeks	to	control	expression	that	takes	place	out	of	work	time.	Evidently	this	places	a	far	more	serious	burden	on	the	right	 to	 freedom	of	expression.	The	 fear	of	 losing	a	 job	or	being	subject	 to	other	disciplinary	measures	may	have	a	severe	chilling	effect	on	such	expression,	 thus	 affecting	 both	 the	 free	 discussion	 of	 ideas	 and	 an	 employee’s	opportunity	for	self-development.		
3.	THE	IMPORTANCE	OF	OTHER	INTERESTS		
																																																								5	E.	Barendt,	Freedom	of	Speech	(Oxford:	OUP,	2005)	18-21.	6	E.	Volokh,	‘Freedom	of	Speech	and	Workplace	Harassment’	(1991)	39	UCLA	L	Rev	1791,	1849.	7	See	eg	S.	Knobloch-Westerwick,	‘Selective	Exposure	and	Reinforcement	of	Attitudes	and	Partisanship	before	a	Presidential	Election’	(2012)	62	Journal	of	Communication	628.	
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While	freedom	of	expression	is	an	important	right,	even	within	the	employment	context,	there	are	countervailing	interests	to	this.	There	can	clearly	be	no	right	for	an	employee	to	 say	 anything	 at	 any	 time	 and	 in	 any	 form.	 Although	 the	 workplace	 may	 be	 an	important	forum	for	expression,	this	is	of	course	not	its	main	purpose.	An	employer	has	legitimate	interests	in	the	economic	and	efficient	functioning	of	its	business.8	Permitting	offensive	 expression	 by	 employees	 may	 well	 distract	 or	 demotivate	 employees,	especially	 if	 it	 is	aimed	at	particular	colleagues.	Even	out	of	work	expression	can	have	spill	over	effects	into	the	workplace,	causing	disruption	and	upset.	Serious	 or	 prolonged	 forms	 of	 offensive	 speech	 may	 also	 amount	 to	harassment.	 Under	 the	 Equality	Act	 2010	 s.26,	 harassment	 takes	 place	 if	 a	 person	engages	in	unwanted	conduct	related	to	a	protected	characteristic,	and	the	conduct	has	the	purpose	or	effect	of	violating	a	person’s	dignity,	or	creating	an	intimidating,	hostile,	 degrading,	 humiliating	 or	 offensive	 environment	 for	 them.	 In	 considering	this,	whether	it	is	reasonable	for	the	conduct	to	have	this	effect,	the	perception	of	the	‘victim’	and	the	other	circumstances	of	the	case	must	be	taken	into	account.	Harassment	 clearly	 causes	 harm	 to	 those	 it	 is	 directed	 towards,	 causing	considerable	 stress	and	potentially	having	serious	effects	on	a	person’s	mental	health.	Employees	can	be	particularly	vulnerable	to	such	expression	since	they	may	feel	unable	to	 challenge	 such	 behaviour,	 particularly	 if	 it	 comes	 from	 senior	 employees,	 and	typically	have	little	opportunity	to	avoid	it	(the	‘captive	audience’	problem).9	Moreover	harassment	does	not	only	 affect	 the	 individuals	 it	 is	 aimed	at.	 Prohibiting	harassment	also	 challenges	 group-based	 disadvantage	 and	 is	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 tackling	discrimination.10	If	 a	person	subjected	 to	harassment	 finds	 the	 situation	 so	 intolerable	that	they	feel	they	must	move	employment,	this	not	only	places	a	great	burden	on	them,	but	 also	 has	 damaging	 effects	 on	 efforts	 to	 break	 down	 discriminatory	 barriers	 in																																																									8	Whether	this	is	a	commercial	activity	or	not.	9	Although	as	Volokh	points	out	the	problem	of	the	captive	audience	is	not	considered	vital	in	other	contexts:	Volokh,	n.	6	above,	1832-8.	10	See	eg	S.	Fredman,	Women	and	the	Law	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1997)	320-331.	
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employment.	If	harassment	is	left	unchecked	it	can	function	in	much	the	same	way	as	a	status	 based	 bar,	 discouraging	 some	 groups	 of	 employees	 from	 entering	 particular	fields.	Even	if	its	effects	are	not	this	severe,	it	‘forces	some	groups	of	employees	to	work	under	real	psychological	burdens	that	other	groups	need	not	bear’.11		Employers	 have	 their	 own	 interest	 in	 preventing	 harassment,	 not	 least	 because	they	 have	 vicarious	 liability	 for	 acts	 performed	 ‘in	 the	 course	 of	 employment’,	 unless	they	 have	 taken	 all	 reasonable	 steps	 to	 prevent	 such	 acts.12	Whilst	 not	 all	 offensive	speech	will	amount	to	harassment,	employers	may	err	on	the	side	of	caution	to	prevent	legal	 liability.	 They	 may	 also	 wish	 to	 protect	 their	 employees	 from	 a	 much	 greater	ranger	of	speech	 in	order	 to	create	a	harmonious	working	environment	and	to	ensure	the	recruitment	and	retention	of	employees.		As	 well	 as	 causing	 disruption	 inside	 the	 workplace,	 offensive	 expression	 may	harm	an	 employer’s	 outside	 interests	 by	 causing	 them	embarrassment	 or	 by	 affecting	the	 image	 or	 reputation	 they	 wish	 to	 promote	 to	 outsiders.	 For	 example,	 if	discriminatory	expression	is	permitted,	this	may	affect	the	employer’s	interest	in	being	seen	 to	 have	 a	 commitment	 to	 diversity	 and	 non-discrimination.	 As	 part	 of	 this	commitment,	an	employer	may	seek	public	acknowledgment	from	an	outside	body	that	prescribed	 standards	have	been	met13	and	 an	 employee	 that	 expresses	discriminatory	views	may	be	seen	as	threatening	this	determination.	Action	may	also	be	taken	by	public	sector	employers	to	ensure	that	they	comply	with	the	equality	duty	under	the	Equality	Act	2010	s.149.14	Even	expression	outside	 the	workplace	may	become	associated	with	an	employer	and	so	it	may	be	called	on	to	distance	itself	from	such	opinions,	perhaps	by																																																									11	Volokh,	n.	6	above,	1846.	12	Equality	Act	2010	s.109.	13	For	example	the	gay	rights	campaigning	organisation	Stonewall	publishes	a	list	of	Top	100	Employers:	‘Stonewall	Top	100	Employers	2014’	<http://www.stonewall.org.uk/at_work/stonewall_top_100_employers/default.asp>	accessed	4	July	2014.	14	This	requires	a	public	authority	to,	inter	alia,	have	due	regard	to	the	need	to	‘eliminate	discrimination,	harassment,	victimisation	and	any	other	conduct	that	is	prohibited	by	or	under	this	Act’	and	‘to	foster	good	relations	between	persons	who	share	a	relevant	protected	characteristic	and	persons	who	do	not	share	it’	in	the	exercise	of	its	functions.	
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disciplining	 the	employee.	Given	 the	widespread	use	of	 social	media,	where	views	can	easily	be	distributed	to	large	numbers	of	people,	comments	can	quickly	become	public.	The	capacity	to	cause	embarrassment	to	employers	is	therefore	great.			
4.	ECHR	LAW	AND	RIGHTS	IN	EMPLOYMENT		While	 in	 only	 a	 few	 cases	 are	 labour	 rights	 specifically	 mentioned	 in	 the	 ECHR,	 the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	 (ECtHR)	has	made	 it	 clear	 that	 the	Convention	does	have	relevance	within	the	employment	context,	protecting	among	other	things,	rights	to	privacy,15	freedom	of	religion16	and	freedom	of	association.17	Any	restriction	of	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression	should	be	considered	through	this	lens.		This	 is	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 ECtHR’s	 decision	 in	 Redfearn	 v	 UK.18 	The	 case	involved	 a	 bus	 driver	 who	 was	 dismissed	 because	 he	 was	 a	 member	 of	 the	 British	National	Party	(BNP)	and	had	stood	for	election	as	a	 local	councillor	 for	 the	party.	His	job	 primarily	 involved	 transporting	 children	 and	 adults	 with	 physical	 and/or	 mental	disabilities.	His	claims	under	domestic	 law	failed.	He	could	not	bring	a	claim	for	unfair	dismissal	as	he	did	not	have	the	requisite	qualifying	period	of	employment.	His,	rather	unconvincing,	claim	that	he	had	been	discriminated	against	‘on	the	grounds	of	race’	was	rejected	 by	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal,	 although	 it	 had	 been	 successful	 in	 the	 Employment	Appeal	 Tribunal.19	The	 ECtHR	 held	 that	 it	 was	 a	 violation	 of	 Article	 11	 (freedom	 of	association)	that	he	did	not	have	an	effective	mechanism	to	challenge	his	dismissal	 for	his	political	views,	although	it	did	not	decide	that	his	dismissal	was	a	violation	in	itself.	
Eweida	 v	 UK20	similarly	 demonstrates	 that	 interferences	 with	 a	 person’s	 freedom	 to	
																																																								15	Niemietz	v	Germany	(1993)	16	EHRR	97;	Copland	v	UK		(2007)	45	EHRR	37.	16	Eweida	v	UK	(2013)	57	EHRR	231.	17	ASLEF	v	UK	(2007)	45	EHRR	34.	18	(2013)	57	EHRR	2.	19	[2005]	IRLR	744	(EAT);	[2006]	EWCA	Civ	659,	[2006]	ICR	1367.	20	Eweida	n.	16	above.	
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manifest	 religious	 beliefs	 during	 employment	 can	 constitute	 a	 violation	 of	 Article	 9	(freedom	of	thought,	conscience	and	religion).		Human	rights	should	not	and	do	not	end	at	the	office	door.	To	do	so	would	create	a	fundamental	imbalance	between	the	employer	and	employee	and	would,	as	Gunn	put	it,	make	‘fundamental	rights	subject	to	mere	contractual	waiver’.21	However,	gaining	the	protection	of	ECHR	rights	within	the	work	context	may	be	complex,	even	if	an	employee	has	 been	 dismissed	 or	 subject	 to	 other	 disciplinary	 action.	 The	 law	 relating	 to	 unfair	dismissal	 will	 be	 addressed	 further	 below.	 First	 though	 I	 will	 consider	 the	 situation	where	 employers	 have	 used	 the	 right	 of	 freedom	 of	 expression	 as	 a	 shield	 to	 defend	themselves	 against	 harassment	 claims,	 since	 these	 cases	 set	 the	 parameters	 of	permissible	workplace	speech.		
5.	HARASSMENT	CLAIMS	AND	FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	
	There	has	been	much	discussion	 in	 the	US	as	 to	whether	 laws	prohibiting	harassment	infringe	the	First	Amendment’s	guarantee	of	 freedom	of	speech.22	Evidently,	given	that	harassing	speech	must	be	prohibited	by	employers,	and	that	there	may	well	be	a	further	‘chilling	 effect’	 as	 employers	 seek	 to	 avoid	 liability,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 draw	 the	parameters	of	this	right	in	a	way	which	does	not	unduly	restrict	freedom	of	expression.	To	date,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 less	 concern	on	 this	 point	 in	 the	UK.	Hepple’s	 point	 that	‘freedom	of	 expression	 is	 the	 dog	 that	 did	 not	 bark	 in	 the	 development	 of	UK	 law	 on	harassment’23	still	 holds	 at	 least	 partially	 true.	 This	 difference	 has	 much	 to	 do	 with	broader	 differences	 in	 the	 attitude	 towards	 freedom	 of	 expression	 between	 the	 two	
																																																								21		T.J.	Gunn,	‘Adjudicating	Rights	of	Conscience	under	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights’,	in	J.	Van	der	Vyver	and	J.	Witte	(eds),	Religious	Human	Rights	in	Global	Perspective:	Legal	
Perspectives	(The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	1996).		22	Eweida	n.	16	above.	23	B.	Hepple,	'Freedom	of	Expression	and	the	Problem	of	Harassment'	in	J.	Beatson	and	Y.	Cripps	(eds),	Freedom	of	Expression	and	Freedom	of	Information:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Sir	David	Williams	(Oxford:	OUP,	2000).	
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jurisdictions.	 In	 particular,	 the	 US	 approach	 is	 highly	 suspicious	 of	 content-based	restrictions	 on	 speech,	 including	 prohibitions	 on	 hate	 speech,24	and	 tends	 to	 disavow	tests	which	balance	the	interest	 in	free	speech	against	other	aims,	 in	direct	contrast	to	the	structure	of	Article	10	ECHR.25		Nevertheless,	 some	 of	 the	 points	 raised	 by	 US	 writers	 are	 still	 pertinent.	 The	major	 concern	 has	 been	 that	 the	 vagueness	 and	 unpredictability	 of	 the	 law,	 and	 the	subjective	element	 in	considering	the	effect	 the	speech	has	on	employees,	mean	that	a	great	deal	of	speech	will	be	prohibited,	when	this	would	receive	high	protection	in	other	contexts.26	It	has	also	been	claimed	that	harassment	law,	particularly	sexual	harassment	law,	has	a	 ‘sanitizing’	effect,	 resting	on	a	 rationalist	management	style	which	does	not	break	 down	 gender	 or	 other	 barriers,	 but	 rather	 is	 applied	 unequally,	 treating	 those	from	ethnic	minorities	or	who	are	gay	more	severely.27	Of	course	 though,	as	discussed	above,	 prohibitions	 on	 harassment	 are	 necessary	 to	 protect	 individuals	 and	 to	 break	down	systemic	discrimination.		Despite	 these	 concerns,	 the	 limited	 number	 of	 Employment	 and	 Employment	Appeal	Tribunal	cases	on	this	topic	appear	so	far	to	demonstrate	sufficient	concern	for	free	speech.	They	have	not	prohibited	expression	which,	while	potentially	offensive,	 is	either	an	important	matter	of	public	debate	or	only	causes	trivial	harm.	This	latter	point	is	demonstrated	by	Heafield	v	Times	Newspapers.28	A	subeditor	claimed	that	he	had	been	subject	 to	 harassment	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 religion	 when	 an	 editor	 shouted	 across	 a	newsroom,	 ‘Can	anyone	tell	what’s	happened	to	the	fucking	Pope?’,	 in	order	to	chase	a	delayed	 article	 relating	 to	 allegations	 that	 the	 Pope	 had	 protected	 a	 priest	 accused	 of	paedophilia.	 The	 EAT	 held	 that	 this	 did	 not	 amount	 to	 harassment	 because	 it	 did	 not	violate	Heafield’s	dignity	or	 create	an	adverse	atmosphere	 for	him.	 In	doing	so	 it	held																																																									24	See	eg	R.A.V	v	St.	Pauls	505	US	377	(1992).	25	J.	Weinstein,	‘An	Overview	of	American	Free	Speech	Doctrine	and	Its	Application	to	Extreme	Speech’	in	I.	Hare	and	J.	Weinstein	(eds),	Extreme	Speech	and	Democracy	(Oxford:	OUP,	2009).	26	Volokh	n.	6	above.	27	V.	Schultz,	‘The	Sanitized	Workplace’	(2003)	112	Yale	LJ	2061.	28	[2013]	UKEATPA/1305/12/BA.	
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that	the	case	was	evidently	‘not	ill-intentioned	or	anti-Catholic	or	directed	at	the	Pope	or	at	Catholics’.		Whilst	the	subeditor	may	not	have	expressed	himself	in	the	most	tactful	way,	the	Employment	Appeal	Tribunal	reached	the	correct	decision.	Mere	incivility	should	not	be	sufficient	 to	 ground	 a	 harassment	 claim.	 Given	 that	 this	 was	 a	 one-off	 remark	 in	 the	heated	environment	of	a	newsroom	under	a	strict	deadline,	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	this	could	have	violated	Heafield’s	dignity	or	created	a	hostile	or	degrading	environment.	The	speech	involved	in	Heafield	was	rather	trivial.	However,	employment	related	speech	can	also	be	on	highly	important	political	matters	which	are	usually	considered	to	be	 at	 the	 core	 of	 free	 speech	 protection.	 This	was	 the	 case	 in	 Fraser	 v	University	 and	
College	 Union.29	The	 nature	 of	 the	 case	 is	 somewhat	 unusual.	 Fraser,	 a	 teacher	 at	secondary	 and	 higher	 education	 level,	 argued	 that	 his	 union	 was	 institutionally	 anti-Semitic	because	of	its	criticism	of	Israel	in	its	policies	towards	Palestine.	He	argued	this	amounted	 to	harassment	on	 the	grounds	of	 race	 and	 religion.	More	 specifically	 it	was	alleged,	among	other	things,	that	the	Union’s	actions	relating	to	a	motion	passed	in	the	Union’s	Congress	 to	boycott	 Israeli	academic	 institutions	and	other	motions	censuring	Israel’s	activities;	its	management	of	an	online	forum	for	members	of	the	Union;	and	the	invitation	of	a	speaker	who	was	found	by	the	South	African	Human	Rights	Commission	to	have	committed	anti-Semitic	hate	speech,30	amounted	to	harassment.	Only	the	final	complaint	was	accepted	as	amounting	to	harassment,	and	this	claim	was	 held	 to	 be	 out	 of	 time.	 The	 rest	 of	 the	 complaints	 were	 firmly	 rejected.	 As	 a	preliminary	point,	 the	case	 faced	a	problem	because	harassment	 is	only	prohibited	on	certain	grounds.	While	Fraser	claimed	that	the	harassment	was	on	the	grounds	of	race,	the	 Union’s	 criticisms	 were	 of	 Israel’s	 policies.	 While	 there	 is	 evidently	 a	 possible	relationship	between	criticism	of	Israel	and	anti-Semitism,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	Zionism																																																									29	[2013]	ET/2203290/2011.	30	Although	the	Tribunal	accepted	that	at	the	time	that	the	Union	was	only	aware	the	complaint	was	awaiting	adjudication.			
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or	an	attachment	to	the	state	of	Israel	in	itself	could	be	a	protected	characteristic.	Whilst	there	may	have	been	a	better	argument	 that	 it	constituted	 indirect	discrimination,	 this	argument	was	not	put	forward	in	the	case.		More	importantly	for	present	purposes,	the	Tribunal	held	that	even	the	subjective	part	of	the	harassment	case	had	not	been	made	out	since	it	had	not	been	demonstrated	that	 Fraser	 felt	 that	 an	 ‘intimidating,	 hostile,	 degrading,	 humiliating	 or	 offensive	environment’	 had	 been	 created	 by	 the	 Union’s	 actions.	 A	 feeling	 of	 ‘upset’	 was	 not	sufficient.	It	was	also	pointed	out	that	as	an	activist,	Fraser	had	to	expect	criticism	and	so	it	was	difficult	to	see	a	response	to	his	activism	as	unwanted.	Finally,	it	was	held	that	even	if	this	had	been	a	borderline	case,	the	importance	of	free	speech	would	have	tipped	the	balance.	The	Union	was	debating	a	matter	of	 important	public	 interest,	which	was	part	of	its	usual	activities.	While,	as	it	accepted,	the	Union	would	in	some	circumstances	have	 to	withdraw	 some	motions,	 to	 be	 required	 to	withdraw	 a	matter	which	was	 the	subject	of	 legitimate	public	 interest	 from	democratic	discussion,	would	be	a	draconian	step.	 This	 was	 so	 even,	 and	 perhaps	 in	 fact	 even	 more	 so,	 when	 the	 issue	 was	controversial.			This	case	 is	 far	 from	being	a	typical	harassment	case	and	so	cannot	be	used	as	a	reliable	guide	to	other	cases.31	Nevertheless	 it	 is	still	an	 illustration	of	how	freedom	of	expression	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 right	 of	 individual	 and	 collective	 political	 expression	can	be	protected	without	unduly	weakening	 the	prohibition	on	harassment.	However,	even	 if	 harassment	 law	 does	 not	 interfere	 too	 greatly	 with	 the	 right	 of	 freedom	 of	expression	in	the	cases	which	come	to	trial,	it	is	still	possible	that	the	very	existence	of	harassment	law	may	give	rise	to	a	‘chilling	effect’	which	poses	a	risk	to	the	right	of	free	expression.	 As	 Volokh	 points	 out,	 this	 effect	 may	 be	 significant	 because	 ‘employers	derive	no	benefit	from	their	employees’	offensive	speech,	but	must	bear	liability	for	it.’32		
																																																								31	And	is	of	course	only	an	Employment	Tribunal	case.	32	Volokh	n.	6	above,	1812.	
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While	 the	 prohibition	 of	 harassment	 requires	 an	 employer	 to	 prohibit	 certain	kinds	 of	 expression,	 a	 greater	 risk	 to	 freedom	 of	 expression	 may	 result	 from	 the	discretionary	limits	placed	on	employees’	expression	by	employers,	which	may	be	much	broader	 than	 is	 required	 by	 law.	 Employees	 may	 therefore	 seek	 recompense	 for	dismissals	which	 they	 consider	breach	 their	Convention	 rights.	 It	 is	 to	 the	question	of	the	 limits	 of	 permissible	 restrictions	 of	 freedom	 of	 expression	 that	 this	 article	 now	turns.			
6.	UNFAIR	DISMISSAL	AND	HUMAN	RIGHTS	LAW		Employees	 may	 bring	 a	 claim	 for	 unfair	 dismissal	 if	 they	 have	 a	 two-year	 qualifying	period	of	employment	or	if	the	expression	relates	to	an	employee’s	political	opinions	or	affiliation.33	However,	 the	 application	 of	 Convention	 rights	 within	 this	 context	 is	 not	straightforward.	The	leading	case	on	the	interrelationship	between	the	ECHR	and	unfair	dismissal	is	X	v	Y.34	X	was	dismissed	when	his	caution	for	gross	indecency	for	engaging	in	 sexual	 activities	 in	 a	 public	 toilet	 was	 revealed	 after	 a	 routine	 check	 at	 work.	 The	Court	of	Appeal	held	that,	as	a	tribunal	is	considered	a	public	body	under	Human	Rights	Act	 1998	 s.6,	 an	 Employment	 Tribunal	 is	 under	 an	 obligation	 to	 take	 into	 account	Convention	rights	in	considering	whether	a	dismissal	was	fair	or	unfair	for	the	purposes	of	the	Employment	Rights	Act	1996	s.98.	Mummery	LJ	laid	down	a	five-stage	process	for	considering	Convention	rights	within	employment,	which	runs	as	follows:	1. Do	the	circumstances	of	the	dismissal	fall	within	the	ambit	of	one	or	more	of	the	 articles	 of	 the	 Convention?	 If	 they	 do	 not,	 the	 Convention	 right	 is	 not	engaged	and	need	not	be	considered	2. If	they	do,	does	the	state	have	a	positive	obligation	to	secure	enjoyment	of	the	relevant	 Convention	 right	 between	 private	 persons?	 If	 it	 does	 not,	 the																																																									33	The	specific	problem	identified	in	Redfearn	has	been	addressed	and	so	there	now	is	no	qualifying	period	of	employment	where	a	person	is	dismissed	because	of	her	‘political	opinions	or	affiliation.’	Employment	Rights	Act	1996	s.108.	as	amended	by	the	Enterprise	and	Regulatory	Reform	Act	2013	s.13	34	[2004]	EWCA	Civ	662,	[2004]	ICR	1634.	
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Convention	right	is	unlikely	to	affect	the	outcome	of	an	unfair	dismissal	claim	against	a	private	employer	3. If	 it	 does,	 is	 the	 interference	 with	 the	 employee’s	 Convention	 right	 by	dismissal	justified?	4. If	 it	 is	 not,	was	 there	 a	 permissible	 reason	 for	 the	dismissal	 under	 the	ERA	which	 does	 not	 involve	 unjustified	 interference	with	 a	 Convention	 right?	 If	there	was	 not,	 the	 dismissal	will	 be	 unfair	 for	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 permissible	reason	to	justify	it	5. If	there	was,	is	the	dismissal	fair,	tested	by	the	provisions	of	section	98	of	the	ERA,	reading	and	giving	effect	to	them	under	section	3	of	the	HRA	so	as	to	be	compatible	with	the	Convention	right?35		In	the	final	analysis,	X’s	case	failed	at	the	first	step	as	it	was	held	that	his	conduct	was	not	part	of	his	private	life.		Article	8	was	therefore	held	not	to	be	engaged,	although	Brooke	LJ	did	express	some	misgivings	as	to	this	conclusion.	Although	not	 significant	 for	 the	 facts	of	 this	 case,	while	 the	ECHR	 is	not	directly	applicable	 in	 cases	 between	 private	 parties,	 this	 test	 importantly	 appears	 to	 require	similar	standards	to	be	applied	between	public	and	private	employers,	given	the	state’s	positive	 obligations	 to	 ensure	 its	 law	 is	 in	 conformity	 with	 the	 Convention.	 It	 seems	unlikely	that	cases	would	or	should	be	decided	differently	on	this	basis.36		The	 relationship	 between	 unfair	 dismissal	 law	 and	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	expression	was	 considered	 in	Pay	v	Lancashire	Probation	Service,37	which	was	decided	shortly	before	X	v	Y.	A	probation	officer	who	worked	with	sex	offenders	was	dismissed	because	 it	 had	 come	 to	 light,	 following	 an	 anonymous	 fax	 to	 the	 police,	 that	 he	performed	 what	 was	 described	 as	 a	 ‘fire	 act’	 at	 fetish	 clubs,	 and	 was	 a	 director	 of	 a	company	 that	 sold	 products	 connected	 with	 bondage	 and	 sadomasochism.	 It	 was	considered	 that	 public	 knowledge	 of	 this	 would	 damage	 the	 Probation	 Service’s	reputation.	Pay	claimed	that	his	dismissal	was	a	violation	of	his	right	to	respect	for	his	private	life	under	Article	8	ECHR	and	of	his	freedom	of	expression.		
																																																								35	Ibid.	1653-4	36	L.	Vickers,	‘Unfair	Dismissal	and	Human	Rights’	(2004)	33	ILJ	52.	37	[2004]	ICR	187	(EAT).	
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The	 Employment	 Appeal	 Tribunal	 accepted	 that	 the	 Tribunal	 had	 a	 duty	 to	interpret	whether	or	not	there	had	been	an	unfair	dismissal	in	line	with	his	Convention	rights,	 but	 it	 was	 held	 that	 his	 right	 to	 respect	 for	 his	 private	 life	 was	 not	 infringed	because	the	activities	took	place	in	public.	His	request	for	an	appeal	was	refused	on	the	basis	that	the	then	recent	decision	in	X	v	Y	negated	his	chance	of	success.	Pay	then	took	his	 case	 to	 the	 ECHR,38	which	 ‘proceeded	 on	 the	 assumption’	 that	 Article	 8	 was	applicable	and	held	that	Art	10	was	applicable,	but	concluded	that	the	infringement	was	justified	because	of	the	interests	of	the	Probation	Service,	given	the	nature	of	his	work	and	the	risk	that	knowledge	of	his	activities	would	become	public.	While	 the	domestic	 and	European	 courts	 considered	 similar	 points	 and	 reached	similar	 conclusions,	 there	 are	 differences	 in	 their	 reasoning	 with	 respect	 to	 the	protection	 given	 to	 freedom	 of	 expression.	 As	 Collins	 and	 Mantouvalou	 point	 out,	 in	considering	whether	 a	 dismissal	was	 fair	 under	 the	 Employment	 Rights	 Act	 1996	 the	question	is	not	whether	the	Employment	Tribunal	would	have	made	the	same	decision,	but	 whether	 the	 decision	 was	 reasonable.39	This	 has	 been	 interpreted	 as	 requiring	consideration	of	whether	 the	employer’s	decision	was	within	 ‘the	 range	of	 reasonable	responses’	 it	 could	 have	 taken.40	There	 is	 a	 distinct	 difference	 in	 emphasis	 between	taking	 into	 account	 concerns	 about	 freedom	 of	 speech	 in	 a	 consideration	 of	reasonableness,	 especially	 such	 an	 attenuated	 assessment	 of	 reasonableness,	 and	 a	starting	 point	 that	 requires	 all	 interferences	with	 freedom	 of	 speech	 to	 be	 justified.41	This	 may	 well	 lead	 to	 a	 watered	 down	 protection	 of	 rights	 within	 the	 employment	context.		
																																																								38	(2009)	48	EHRR	15.	39	H.	Collins	and	V.	Mantouvalou,	‘Private	Life	and	Dismissal:	Pay	v	UK’	(2009)	38	ILJ	133.	40	HSBC	Bank	plc	v	Madden	[2001]	1	All	ER	550	41	P.	Elias	and	J.	Coppel,	‘Freedom	of	Expression	and	Freedom	of	Religion:	Some	Thoughts	on	the	Glenn	Hoddle	Case’	in	J.	Beatson	and	Y.	Cripps	(eds),	Freedom	of	Expression	and	Freedom	of	
Information:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Sir	David	Williams	(Oxford:	OUP,	2000);	H.	Collins,	‘The	Protection	of	Civil	Liberties	in	the	Workplace’	(2006)	69	MLR	619.		
	 14	
Although	not	relevant	 to	 the	main	argument	of	 this	article,	 the	Court	of	Appeal’s	conclusion	that	there	was	no	interference	with	X’s	private	life	because	his	actions	took	place	in	public	rests	on	an	impoverished	view	of	this	concept.	A	rigid	distinction	relying	on	 a	 dichotomy	 between	 private	 and	 public	 space	 is	 unrealistic.	 The	 ECtHR	 has	recognised	a	right	 to	privacy	 for	acts	 that	 take	place	wholly	 in	public,	42	and	Pay’s	acts	took	 place	 in	 at	 least	 a	 semi-private	 environment.	 Furthermore,	 even	 the	 ECtHR’s	decision	can	be	criticised	for	not	sufficiently	protecting	rights	of	expression	and	privacy.	The	justification	put	forward	rested	on	a	general	fear	that	his	activities	would	lead	to	a	loss	 of	 public	 confidence	 in	 the	 probation	 service,	 without	 real	 consideration	 of	 how	they	 affected	 his	 work.	 The	 case	 has	 unfortunate	 overtones	 of	 Saunders	 v	 Scottish	
National	 Camps	 Association 43 	in	 its	 perception	 of	 sexual	 minorities	 as	 deviant. 44	However,	 it	 is	 arguable	 that	 Pay	 should	 have	 taken	 more	 care	 to	 ensure	 that	photographs	of	him	performing	would	not	be	publicly	available.			
7.	 WORKPLACE	 EXPRESSION	 AND	 THE	 RIGHT	 TO	 MANIFEST	 A	 RELIGION	 OR	
BELIEF		If	 the	expression	relates	to	an	aspect	of	a	person’s	religion	or	belief,	an	employee	may	not	 only	 have	 an	 unfair	 dismissal	 claim	 but	 also	 a	 claim	 that	 the	 restriction	 on	 the	expression	amounts	to	indirect	religious	discrimination.	In	considering	this,	the	right	to	manifest	 a	 religion	 or	 belief	 under	 Article	 9	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account.45	This	 is	 a	greater	 right	 than	may	be	 immediately	apparent.	 ‘Belief’	has	been	 interpreted	broadly	
																																																								42	Eg	Peck	v	UK	(2003)	36	EHRR	41;	Von	Hannover	v	Germany	(2005)	40	EHRR	1.	This	is	also	the	case	in	domestic	law,	eg	Campbell	v	Mirror	Group	Newspapers	Ltd	[2004]	UKHL	22,	[2004]	2	AC	457.	43	[1980]	IRLR	174.	Saunders	was	a	gay	man	employed	as	a	handyman	at	a	children’s	camp.	It	was	held	that	dismissing	him	because	of	his	sexual	orientation	was	a	course	open	to	a	reasonable	employer.	44	B.	Chatterjee,	‘Pay	v	UK,	the	Probation	Service	and	Consensual	BDSM	Sexual	Citizenship’	(2012)	15	Sexualities	739.	45	Mba	v	Merton	LBC	[2013]	EWCA	Civ	1562,	[2014]	1	All	ER	1235.	
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for	the	purposes	of	the	Equality	Act	2010,46	to	include	for	example	beliefs	in	man-made	climate	change	and	environmentalism47	and	in	an	ethos	of	public	service	broadcasting.48	No	qualifying	period	of	employment	 is	needed	 to	bring	 this	claim.	Such	a	claim	would	have	 been	 unlikely	 to	 provide	 redress	 in	 situations	 such	 as	 in	Redfearn	 though,	 since	support	 for	 a	 political	 party	 is	 not	 considered	 to	 amount	 to	 a	 ‘belief’.	 Support	 for	 the	BNP’s	 policies	would	 also	 be	 likely	 to	 be	 excluded,	 since	 in	 order	 to	 be	 counted	 as	 a	belief	 it	must	be	 ‘worthy	of	 respect	 in	a	democratic	society	and	not	 incompatible	with	human	 dignity’.49	Such	 restrictions	 on	 ‘belief’	 may	 well	 be	 appropriate:	 indeed	 the	concept	of	belief	may	already	have	been	stretched	beyond	its	comfortable	meaning.		In	 a	 development	 which	may	 at	 first	 sight	 seem	 rather	 paradoxical,	 cases	 have	arisen	 where	 employees	 have	 argued	 that	 they	 have	 been	 subject	 to	 discrimination	because	they	have	been	dismissed	for	sharing	religious	views	which	are	discriminatory	and	offensive	towards	gay	people.	While	these	cases	work	better	conceptually	as	claims	of	 a	 violation	 of	 religious	 freedom	 under	 Article	 9,	 rather	 than	 discrimination	 claims,	they	 are	 still	 understandable	within	 this	 context.	 The	 argument	 runs	 as	 follows:	 since	Christians	 belonging	 to	 certain	 denominations	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 particular	(negative)	 views	 about	 homosexuality	 and	 related	matters	 such	 as	 gay	marriage,	 and	also	 to	 believe	 that	 they	 are	 under	 a	 religious	 obligation	 to	 share	 these	 beliefs	 with	others,	 limiting	 their	 ability	 to	 do	 so	 places	 them	 at	 a	 particular	 disadvantage.	 It	therefore	amounts	to	indirect	discrimination.	These	 issues	 were	 considered	 in	 Apelogun-Gabriels	 v	 London	 Borough	 of	
Lambeth.50	The	claimant,	an	Evangelical	Christian,	ran	a	prayer	meeting	at	work	with	the	consent	 of	 his	 employers.	 After	 one	meeting	 he	 distributed	 a	 document	with	 extracts	from	 the	Bible	 to	 colleagues	who	had	not	attended	 the	meeting.	The	 first	headings	on																																																									46	And	the	preceding	Employment	Equality	(Religion	or	Belief)	Regulations	2003.	47	Grainger	plc	v	Nicholson	[2010]	2	All	ER	253	(EAT).	48	Maistry	v	BBC	(2011)	ET/1313142/2010.	49	R	(Williamson)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Education	and	Employment	[2005]	UKHL	15,	[2005]	2	AC	246.		50	(2006)	ET/2301976/05.		
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this	 document	were	 ‘sexual	 activity	 between	members	 of	 the	 same	 sex	 is	 universally	condemned’	and	‘male	homosexuality	is	forbidden	by	law	and	punished	by	death’.	As	a	result	of	this	he	was	dismissed.	The	Tribunal	held	that	the	Council	had	not	subjected	him	to	either	direct	or	indirect	religious	discrimination	or	unfairly	dismissed	him.		Hambler,	 although	 he	 seems	 to	 agree	 with	 the	 result,	 criticises	 the	 Tribunal’s	decision.	He	argues	 that	 the	Tribunal,	by	stating	 that	 it	 ‘considered	the	wording	of	 the	selected	 extracts	 from	 the	 Bible	 involved	 to	 be	 uncompromising	 and	 strongly	condemnatory	of	homosexual	conduct’,	comes	‘perilously	close	to	condemning	the	Bible	itself’,	 because	 ‘it	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 find	 references	 to	 homosexuality	 within	 the	 plain	meaning	 of	 the	 Bible	 which	 are	 not	 in	 some	 way	 “uncompromising	 and	 strongly	condemnatory”’.	51	He	 argues	 that	 this	 contradicts	 previous	 caselaw52	which	 does	 not	‘seek	to	exclude	“homophobic	verses”	of	the	Bible	from	acceptable	discourse’.53		However,	 the	 Tribunal’s	 point	 seems	 only	 to	 be	 the	 unobjectionable	 one	 of	describing	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 expression	 and	 considering	 how	 ‘hostile’,	 ‘degrading’	 or	‘offensive’	it	is,	rather	than	an	attempt	to	exclude	conservative	religious	viewpoints	from	the	field	of	acceptable	beliefs.	In	any	case,	there	can	be	no	protection	of	expression	only	because	 it	 is	 taken	 from	 the	 Bible.	 To	 do	 so	 would	 violate	 basic	 rights	 of	 non-discrimination	and	religious	 freedom,	since	 it	would	privilege	Christianity	above	other	religious	or	non-religious	beliefs.54	While	interferences	with	religious	expression	should	be	strictly	assessed,	it	could	clearly	be	justifiable	in	some	contexts	for	employees	to	be	dismissed	for	quoting	parts	of	the	Bible.	For	example,	parts	of	the	New	Testament	such	as	 the	 Jewish	 crowds’	 demand	 to	 have	 Jesus	 crucified	 have	 been	 used	 historically	 to																																																									51	A.	Hambler,	‘A	Private	Matter?	Evolving	Approaches	to	the	Freedom	to	Manifest	Religious	Convictions	in	the	Workplace’	(2008)	3	Religion	and	Human	Rights	111,	131.		52	Hambler	refers	to	R	(Amicus)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Trade	and	Industry	[2004]	EWHC	860	(Admin),	[2007]	ICR	1176.		Further	examples	are	Ladele	v	Islington	LBC	[2009]	EWCA	Civ	1357,	[2010]	1	WLR	955	and	Re	Christian	Institute’s	Application	for	Judicial	Review	[2007]	NIQB	66.	53	Hambler	n.	51	above,	131.	54	As	Sir	James	Munby	stated,	‘Reliance	upon	religious	belief,	however	conscientious	the	belief	and	however	ancient	and	respectable	the	religion,	can	never	of	itself	immunise	the	believer	from	the	reach	of	the	secular	law’:	J.	Munby,	‘Law,	Morality	and	Religion	in	the	Family	Courts’	(2014)	16	Ecc	LJ	131,	138.	
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justify	appalling	anti-Semitism.55	If	an	employee	repeatedly	referred	to	this	 in	order	to	criticise	a	Jewish	colleague,	the	employer	would	be	justified	in	dismissing	her.		It	 could	be	argued	 that	 a	 final	warning	would	have	been	more	appropriate	 than	dismissal,	 given	 that	 this	was	 the	 first	 incident	of	 such	behaviour.	Evidently,	dismissal	was	a	great	 interference	with	Apelogun-Gabriels’	 freedom	of	expression.	However,	 the	views	 expressed	 were	 highly	 inflammatory,	 given	 in	 particular	 that	 they	 could	 be	interpreted	 as	 calling	 for	 violence	 against	 gay	 people.	 They	 were	 unsought	 by	 his	colleagues	who	did	not	attend	the	prayer	meeting,	and	had	led	to	complaints.	Although	this	 was	 the	 first	 time	 that	 Apelogun-Gabriels	 had	 shared	 such	 views	 at	 work,	 after	carrying	 out	 a	 disciplinary	 hearing,	 his	 employer	 was	 unconvinced	 that	 similar	behaviour	 would	 not	 reoccur.	 His	 colleagues’	 interest	 in	 not	 being	 faced	 with	 such	material,	 together	 with	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 employer	 in	 maintaining	 a	 non-discriminatory	 workplace	 therefore	 outweighed	 the	 interference	 with	 the	 claimant’s	right.	The	decision	reached	was	justifiable.	
Haye	v	London	Borough	of	Lewisham56	raises	 similar	 points,	 although	 the	 speech	was	directed	outside	the	organisation	rather	than	internally.	Haye	sent	an	email	whilst	at	work	and	from	her	work	account	to	the	Lesbian	and	Gay	Christian	Movement	(LGCM).	In	 it	she	stated	that	being	gay	is	a	sin,	 that	LGCM	was	 ‘deceiving’	people	 into	believing	that	it	was	acceptable	to	be	gay	and	a	Christian	and	urged	the	reader	‘to	repent	and	turn	from	 your	 sinful	 ways	 before	 its	 [sic]	 too	 late…	 Hell	 is	 not	 a	 nice	 place’.	 Haye	 was	dismissed	 for	 sending	 an	 email	 containing	 homophobic	 views	 and	 for	 bringing	 the	council	 into	 disrepute.	 She	 claimed	 she	 had	 been	 either	 directly	 or	 indirectly	discriminated	 against	 because	 of	 her	 religious	 beliefs	 and	 that	 she	 had	 been	 unfairly	dismissed.	 She	 believed	 that	 it	was	 part	 of	 her	 religious	 duty	 to	 ‘spread	 the	 Christian	message	to	other	Christians’.																																																										55	See	eg	D.	MacCulloch,	Christianity:	The	First	Three	Thousand	Years	(London:	Penguin,	2010)	92-3.	56	(2010)	ET	2301852/2009.	
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The	Tribunal	held	she	had	not	been	directly	discriminated	against	since	she	was	not	 dismissed	 because	 of	 the	 Christian	 nature	 of	 the	 email	 but	 because	 of	 its	offensiveness.	 This	 seems	 straightforward:	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	 if	 the	 email	 had	been	 sent	 by	 anyone	 with	 a	 different	 or	 no	 faith	 they	 would	 have	 been	 treated	differently.		The	Tribunal	 also	 held	 there	was	 no	 indirect	 discrimination,	 either	 because	 she	could	still	‘witness’	to	people	outside	work	and	thus	she	was	not	put	at	a	disadvantage,	or	because	the	council	had	a	proportionate	means	of	achieving	a	legitimate	aim.	The	first	argument	 is	 unsatisfactory,	 although	 this	 is	 probably	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	submissions	 on	 indirect	 discrimination	were	described	 as	 ‘very	 vague’.	Whether	Haye	could	witness	to	people	outside	work	and	therefore	manifest	her	beliefs	 in	other	ways	was	not	particularly	relevant	to	whether	the	interference	with	her	religious	practice	in	her	 employment	was	proportionate.	 Such	 reasoning	was	not	however	unusual.	Before	the	ECtHR’s	decision	 in	Eweida	v	UK57	it	 had	been	held	 that	 there	was	no	 interference	with	 Article	 9	where	 an	 employee	 could	 resign	 and	 thus	 avoid	 conflicts	 between	 her	religious	 views	 and	 employment	 obligations.58	This	 idea	 had	 though	 been	 severely	criticised	and	was	reconsidered	in	Eweida.	A	 better	 argument,	which	 is	 suggested	 in	 the	decision,	 is	 that	while	 Lewisham’s	policy	 may	 have	 put	 evangelical	 Christians	 at	 a	 disadvantage,	 since	 it	 made	 it	 more	difficult	for	them	to	fulfil	their	religious	duty	of	evangelism,	preventing	such	vehement	views	 from	 being	 spread	 from	 the	 council’s	 email	 system	was	 fully	 justifiable.	 As	 the	Tribunal	 stated,	 ‘on	 any	 objective	 view,	 it	 is	 highly	 offensive,	 homophobic	 and	 the	language	is	aggressive	and	violent’.	While	it	might	be	going	too	far	to	describe	her	email	as	 ‘violent’,	 since	 it	did	not	 call	 for	physical	 aggression,	 it	 certainly	 contained	extreme	views.	By	so	vehemently	criticising	gay	people’s	sexuality,	it	undermined	the	dignity	of																																																									57	Eweida	n.	16	above.	58	See	eg	Ahmad	v	UK	(1981)	4	EHRR	126.	I	have	previously	discussed	these	issues	in	M.	Pearson,	‘Article	9	at	a	Crossroads:	Interference	Before	and	After	Eweida	(2013)	13	HRLR	580.			
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those	 it	was	 aimed	 at.	 It	 is	 also	 highly	 relevant	 that	 it	was	 sent	 from	 her	work	 email	address,	 thus	 linking	 her	 views	with	 those	 of	 her	 employer	 in	 the	mind	 of	 an	 outside	organisation.	The	only	way	 the	employer	 could	clearly	distance	 itself	 from	such	views	was	to	dismiss	her.	However,	not	all	discriminatory	views	expressed	within	work	should	necessarily	be	 prohibited.	 This	 issue	was	 raised	 obliquely	 in	Ladele	 v	 Islington	Borough	Council.59	Ladele,	a	registrar,	sought	an	exemption	from	performing	civil	partnership	ceremonies	because	 of	 her	 religious	 belief	 that	 marriage	 should	 only	 be	 between	 a	 man	 and	 a	woman	and	thus	that	it	would	be	wrong	for	her	to	assist	in	creating	such	relationships.	Other	 employees	 believed	 her	 attempts	 to	 avoid	 performing	 them	were	 offensive	 and	homophobic.	 Leaving	 aside	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 Council	 should	 have	 been	required	 to	 accede	 to	 her	 request,	 should	 her	 request	 for	 accommodation	 be	protected?60		As	 Vickers	 argues,	 merely	 asking	 for	 an	 exemption	 from	 performing	 certain	aspects	of	a	role,	even	if	this	is	for	discriminatory	reasons,	‘should	not	without	more	be	considered	harassment,	unless	this	has	been	done	in	an	offensive	manner’.	61		To	do	so	seems	likely	to	fan	the	flames	of	what	are	already	controversial	matters	and	reduce	the	protection	of	free	speech	and	freedom	of	religion,	without	necessarily	providing	greater	protection	of	the	non-discrimination	norm.		There	 are	 crucial	 differences	 between	 Ladele	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 Apelogun-
Gabriel	and	Haye	on	the	other.	Ladele’s	act	was	primarily	 inward	 looking.	She	was	not	seeking	 to	proselytise	but	merely	 to	claim	a	 right	 for	herself.	Her	gay	colleagues	were	faced	only	with	the	knowledge	that	she	strongly	disapproved	of	gay	marriage	and	civil	partnerships	for	religious	reasons.	In	contrast,	Apelogun-Gabriels’	and	Haye’s	acts	were	outward	looking	and	involved	active	proselytising	of	their	controversial	views.																																																										59	Ladele	n.	52	above.	60	This	issue	was	not	directly	raised	in	the	case.	61	L.	Vickers,	‘Religious	Discrimination	in	the	Workplace:	An	Emerging	Hierarchy?’	(2010)	12	Ecc	LJ	280,	296.	
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Dismissal	 in	both	Haye	and	Apelogun-Gabriels	was	a	reasonable	response.	Whilst	there	 is	 an	 argument	 that	 these	 cases	 demonstrate	 an	 unsympathetic	 response	 to	religious	 believers	 who	wish	 to	 share	 their	 beliefs,	 which	 contrasts	 unfairly	 with	 the	wider	 scope	 given	 to	 those	 who	 share	 views	 which	 are	 offensive	 to	 some	 religious	people,	there	is	no	real	inconsistency	between	the	two	sets	of	cases.	Absent	exceptional	circumstances,	 the	mere	 discussion	 of	 religious	 or	 political	 viewpoints	 should	 not	 be	prohibited.	 Exceptions	 to	 freedom	 of	 expression	 and,	 if	 relevant,	 freedom	 of	 religion	should	 be	 strictly	 interpreted	 in	 discrimination	 and	 unfair	 dismissal	 claims.	However,	this	 does	 not	 give	 the	 ‘obdurate	 believer’62	carte	 blanche	 to	 spread	 discriminatory	views:	 the	 rights	 of	 others	 must	 be	 considered.	 Where	 this	 expression	 is	 abusive	 or	threatening,	it	is	very	likely	to	be	proportionate	to	prohibit	it.		
8.	EXPRESSION	OUTSIDE	WORK	
	Restrictions	 on	 expression	 outside	work	 infringe	 freedom	of	 expression	 and	 affect	 an	employee’s	rights	to	autonomy	more	deeply	than	restrictions	on	speech	within	work.	An	important	 aspect	 of	 this	 right	 of	 autonomy	 is	 a	 right	 to	 ‘a	 life	 away	 from	work,’	63	of	which	freedom	of	expression	on	controversial	or	offensive	matters	is	a	part.	Such	a	right	leads	 to	 ‘better	equality	between	employer	and	employee	by	giving	content	 to	what	 it	means	to	society	for	persons	to	be	free	of	control	over	their	private	lives…	give[s]	effect	to	 the	value	people	attach	 to	engagement	 in	non-work	activities	meaningful	 to	 them…	and	 cabin[s]	 worklife	 from	 non-work	 life.’64	In	 addition	 to	 concerns	 about	 autonomy,	permitting	 employers	 to	 dismiss	 employees	 because	 of	 their	 out	 of	 work	 expression	may	greatly	affect	their	ability	to	share	in	social	or	political	discourses.	It	may	thus	affect	the	 quality	 and	 extent	 of	 expression	 generally.	 As	 Barendt	 puts	 it,	 ‘employees	 retain																																																									62	A.	Bradney,	Law	and	Faith	in	a	Sceptical	Age	(Oxford:	Routledge-Cavendish,	2009).	63	M.	W.	Finkin,	‘Life	Away	from	Work’	(2005)	66	La	L	Rev	945.	64	Ibid.	951	
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their	interest	as	citizens	in	being	free	to	express	their	views	and	exchange	information	with	others’.65	However,	 it	would	be	 inappropriate	 for	employers	never	 to	be	able	 to	discipline	employees	for	their	out	of	work	expression.	Unless	it	takes	action,	an	employer	may	be	seen	as	tacitly	condoning	an	employee’s	views,	thus	lowering	public	trust	and	the	trust	of	other	employees	 in	 the	employer.	Particularly	where	 the	expression	 is	at	odds	with	the	 aim	 of	 the	 employment,	 it	 may	 also	 affect	 the	 employer’s	 perception	 of	 the	employee’s	ability	and	willingness	to	perform	her	work.	Finally,	if	expression	is	targeted	at	 particular	 colleagues	 this	 may	 undermine	 their	 dignity	 or	 create	 an	 unbearable	working	 environment	 in	 exactly	 the	 same	way	 as	 if	 the	 expression	 took	 place	within	employment.	 Nevertheless,	 restrictions	 on	 out	 of	 work	 speech	 should	 be	 rare.	 The	crucial	 issue	 should	 be	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 link	 between	 the	 expression	 and	employment,	beyond	vague	concerns	about	an	employers’	reputation.	Such	a	link	could	include	 situations	 where	 the	 speech	 is	 directly	 contrary	 to	 the	 specific	 aims	 of	 the	employer,	or	an	employee	suggests	that	she	has	the	support	of	the	employer	in	making	such	statements.	
R	 (Raabe)	 v	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 the	 Home	 Department66 	demonstrates	 the	challenges	 these	 issues	present	 clearly,	 although	 the	 case	 involved	 a	 claim	 for	 judicial	review	 rather	 than	 unfair	 dismissal.	 Raabe,	 a	 GP,	 was	 appointed	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	Advisory	Council	on	the	Misuse	of	Drugs	(ACMD).	The	post	was	unpaid.	Six	years	before	his	 appointment	 he	 had	 co-authored	 a	 short	 paper	 entitled	 ‘“Gay	 Marriage”	 and	Homosexuality:	Some	Medical	Comments’	that	argued	against	the	introduction	of	same-sex	marriage	 in	 Canada.	 It	 stated	 that	 gay	men	were	 extremely	 sexually	 promiscuous	and	engaged	in	risky	sexual	practices,	that	they	tended	to	have	short	relationships	and	that	this	posed	a	risk	 for	children	brought	up	by	gay	people	and,	most	controversially,	that	there	was	a	link	between	homosexuality	and	paedophilia.	It	stated	that	‘paedophile																																																									65	Barendt	n.5	above,	490.	66	[2013]	EWHC	1736	(Admin).	
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organisations	 were	 originally	 a	 part	 of	 the	 gay/lesbian	 coalition’	 and	 that	 ‘the	prevalence	 of	 paedophilia	 among	 homosexuals	 is	 about	 10	 –	 25	 times	 higher’	 than	heterosexuals’.67	It	also	argued	that	it	was	possible	for	some	gay	people	to	change	their	sexual	orientation	by	‘reparative	therapy’.	The	Home	Office	became	aware	of	the	paper	after	 Raabe	 had	 been	 appointed	 and	 it	 was	 the	 subject	 of	 media	 attention.	Unsurprisingly,	 the	 situation	 led	 to	 controversy	 and	 other	 members	 of	 the	 ACMD	threatened	 to	 resign	 if	 he	 was	 not	 dismissed.	 After	 a	 period	 of	 consideration,	 the	government	did	so	and	Raabe	challenged	this	decision.		The	High	Court	held	that	dismissing	him	was	not	an	interference	with	his	freedom	of	 religion	 as,	while	 he	was	motivated	 by	 his	 religious	 views,	 he	was	 not	manifesting	them.	This	was	because	the	paper	purported	to	be	a	neutral	scientific	paper	rather	than	a	 religious	 tract,	 not	 mentioning	 any	 religious	 precepts	 at	 all.	 Raabe’s	 religious	opposition	to	same-sex	marriage	was	not	the	issue.	This	reasoning	is	 justifiable.	Raabe	could	not	argue	both	 that	 the	paper	was	not	 controversial	because	 it	merely	 reported	scientific	data,	and	that	it	was	a	manifestation	of	his	religious	views.	However,	it	was	of	course	 an	 interference	 with	 his	 freedom	 of	 expression	 and	 so	 the	 question	 remains	whether	the	interference	with	his	rights	was	proportionate.	A	 combination	 of	 factors	 make	 his	 dismissal	 proportionate.	 Firstly	 there	 is	 the	offensiveness	of	 the	paper,	particularly	 the	 linking	of	homosexuality	with	paedophilia.	Although	 presented	 as	 a	 scientific	 document,	 the	 paper	 was	 not	 a	 summary	 of	 peer-reviewed	studies	but	a	polemic	against	gay	people.	Although	the	paper	was	not	recent,	Raabe	 refused	 to	 distance	 himself	 from	 such	 views.	 Secondly,	 the	 ACMD	 had	 only	recently	had	a	number	of	high-profile	resignations	and	were	anxious	that	more	should	not	 occur.	 It	was	 also	 considered	 important	 for	 the	ACMD	 to	 have	 the	 support	 of	 gay	people	 because	 research	 had	 identified	 that	 there	 were	 particular	 patterns	 of	 drug	misuse	within	that	community.																																																										67	Ibid.	[40].	
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Furthermore,	 there	were	 grounds	 for	 dismissing	 him	which	 did	 not	 rest	 on	 the	offensiveness	of	 the	 expression.	His	 role	 in	 the	organisation	was	 to	 consider	 evidence	relating	 to	 the	 misuse	 of	 drugs	 and	 to	 suggest	 policies	 relating	 to	 this.	 The	 paper	demonstrated	 a	 misuse	 of	 data	 in	 order	 to	 support	 his	 personal	 views.	 This	 is	particularly	 true	 in	 relation	 to	his	 claims	about	homosexuality	and	paedophilia,	which	did	not	take	into	account	that	a	predilection	for	abusing	children	of	one	sex	often	does	not	correlate	with	sexual	orientation	towards	adults.	Therefore	the	percentage	of	abuse	which	is	‘homosexual	in	nature’,	in	that	it	is	committed	by	an	adult	of	the	same	sex	as	the	child,	 does	 not	 provide	 information	 about	 the	 prevalence	 of	 paedophilia	 among	 gay	people.68	Such	a	use	of	data	was	 counter	 to	 the	 role	he	was	expected	 to	perform.	This	was	 particularly	 important	 because	 consideration	 of	 the	 ACMD’s	 work	 had	 been	dominated	by	discussions	as	to	whether	a	‘harm	reduction’	approach	to	drug	use	was	an	appropriate	 strategy.	While	 Raabe	 strongly	 opposed	 this,	 this	 had	 been	 the	 dominant	approach	of	the	ACMD.	The	Home	Office’s	decision	 to	dismiss	him	 is	 therefore	 justifiable.	However,	 this	case	 involved	 an	 unusual,	 very	 public,	 policy	 role	 position.	 In	 most	 cases	 employees’	expression	does	not	directly	have	an	impact	on	their	employment.	An	employee	should	usually	be	protected	when	they	share	 their	opinions	with	others	outside	work,	even	 if	others	find	these	views	offensive.	
Smith	 v	 Trafford	 Housing	 Trust69	demonstrates	 the	 risk	 to	 free	 expression	 that	disciplinary	 action	 in	 employment	 can	 pose.	A	 Housing	 Manager,	 who	 had	 listed	 his	employment	on	his	Facebook	page,	put	a	link	on	Facebook	to	a	news	article	entitled	‘Gay	church	‘marriages’	set	to	get	the	go-ahead’,	with	the	comment	‘an	equality	too	far’.	After	a	colleague	posted	‘does	this	mean	you	don’t	approve?’	he	replied:	
No	not	really,	I	don’t	understand	why	people	who	have	no	faith	and	don’t	believe	in	 Christ	 would	 want	 to	 get	 hitched	 in	 church	 the	 bible	 is	 quite	 specific	 that																																																									68	Ibid.	[164]–[169].		69	[2012]	EWHC	3221	(Ch).	
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marriage	is	for	men	and	women	if	the	state	wants	to	offer	civil	marriage	to	same	sex	then	that	is	up	to	the	state;	but	the	state	shouldn’t	impose	it’s	rules	on	places	of	faith	and	conscience.70			Because	 of	 these	 comments	 he	was	 demoted	 to	 a	 non-managerial	 position	with	 a	40%	reduction	in	pay.	His	employer	considered	that	he	had	committed	a	serious	breach	of	 the	 Equal	 Opportunities	 Policy	 and	 that	 the	 comments	 ‘had	 the	 potential	 to	 cause	offence’	and	that	they	‘could	be	seriously	prejudicial	to	the	reputation	of	the	Trust’.	He	claimed	that	the	trust	had	committed	a	breach	of	contract	in	demoting	him.	He	did	not	bring	 a	 case	 for	 unfair	 dismissal	 because	he	did	not	 have	 the	 funds	 to	 do	 so	until	 the	time	limit	to	bring	such	proceedings	had	expired.	71	In	 deciding	 the	 case,	 the	 High	 Court	 focused	 on	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 employment	contract	 and	 did	 not	 directly	 consider	 his	 rights	 to	 freedom	of	 expression	 or	 religion.	However,	the	Court	identified	the	relevant	factors	for	this	discussion	and	correctly	held	that	in	demoting	him	Trafford	Housing	Trust	had	breached	his	contract	of	employment.	Briggs	 J	 said	 that	he	had	come	 ‘without	difficulty’	 to	 the	conclusion	 that	 ‘his	moderate	expression	 of	 his	 particular	 views	 about	 gay	 marriage	 in	 church,	 on	 his	 personal	Facebook	 wall	 at	 a	 weekend	 out	 of	 working	 hours,	 could	 not	 sensibly	 lead	 any	reasonable	 reader	 to	 think	 the	 worst	 of	 the	 Trust	 for	 having	 employed	 him	 as	 a	manager’	 and	 thus	 he	 did	 not	 bring	 the	 Trust	 into	 disrepute.	 It	 was	 held	 that	 his	expression	of	his	views	could	not	‘objectively	be	described	as	judgmental,	disrespectful	or	liable	to	cause	discomfort,	embarrassment	or	upset.’		In	 considering	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 speech	 and	 its	 likely	 effects,	 Smith	 therefore	demonstrates	 a	 ‘principled	 and	 sensible	 approach’.72	The	 expression	was	 on	 a	matter	entirely	unconcerned	within	his	work.	The	mere	fact	that	he	listed	his	job,	among	other	things,	on	his	Facebook	page	and	that	some	of	his	colleagues	were	his	Facebook	friends	did	 not	 strongly	 link	 his	 expression	 to	 his	 employment.	 Furthermore,	 the	 subject	 of																																																									70	Ibid.	[4].	71	The	limit	is	3	months	as	opposed	to	6	years	for	breach	of	contract	claims.	72	D.	McGoldrick,	‘The	Limits	of	Freedom	of	Expression	on	Facebook	and	Social	Networking	Sites:	A	UK	Perspective’	(2013)	13	HRLR	125,	149.	
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same-sex	marriage,	and	more	precisely	 same-sex	marriage	 in	 religious	premises,	 is	an	important	matter	of	public	 interest	 and	debate.	 It	 should	not	be	entirely	 restricted	on	the	 ground	 it	might	 cause	offence,	 as	 this	would	greatly	 affect	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	of	expression.	 It	 should	be	noted	 that	 Smith’s	 explanation	of	his	 views	actually	 accorded	with	 the	 position	 the	 law	 took:	 it	 was	 widely	 recognised	 that	 requiring	 religious	institutions	to	perform	same-sex	marriages	would	violate	their	religious	freedom.		Where	though	there	 is	a	clear	 link	between	the	expression	and	the	employment,	the	 fact	 that	 it	 takes	place	out	of	work	becomes	 less	 relevant.	This	 is	particularly	 true	where	 the	expression	 is	offensive	because	 it	 is	 aimed	at	 a	particular	 employee,	 rather	than	a	general	discussion	on	a	matter	of	public	debate.	In	such	circumstances	the	public	interest	 in	ensuring	debate	 is	usually	very	minimal	and	the	 level	of	distress	caused	by	such	expression	will	presumably	be	higher.		
Joseph	 v	 TeleTech	 UK	 Ltd73	is	 an	 example	 of	 such	 low	 value	 expression.	 Joseph	stated	 on	 Facebook:	 ‘quick	 question	who	 in	 Teletech	 has	 A	 [a	 colleague]	 not	 tried	 to	fuck?		She	does	get	around!’.	Far	from	deleting	the	comment	when	A	requested	he	do	so,	he	made	another	derogatory	comment	about	her	on	Facebook.	He	was	dismissed	on	the	basis	that	he	had	harassed	A	and	brought	the	company	into	disrepute.	The	Tribunal	held	that	his	Article	10	rights	were	not	engaged	and	he	failed	in	his	claim	of	unfair	dismissal.			While	the	Tribunal	may	be	right	to	argue	that	‘the	right	of	freedom	of	expression	does	 not	 entitle	 the	 claimant	 to	 make	 comments	 which	 damage	 the	 reputation	 or	infringe	the	rights	of	A,’74	it	 is	difficult	to	agree	with	its	conclusion	that	Joseph’s	Art	10	rights	 were	 not	 engaged.	 He	 was	 subject	 to	 a	 severe	 detriment,	 the	 loss	 of	 his	 job,	because	 of	 his	 expression.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 comments	merely	 involved	 abusive	 low-level	 speech	 which	 could	 clearly	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 violating	 A’s	 dignity,	 and	 so	 the	Tribunal’s	 decision	 was	 correct.	 Harassing	 comments	 may	 evidently	 be	 hurtful	regardless	 of	whether	 they	 are	made	 in	 or	 outside	work	 time.	 It	 is	 also	 relevant	 that																																																									73	(2012)	NIIT/00704_11IT.	Discussed	in	McGoldrick	ibid.	74	Joseph	ibid.	[6].	
	 26	
Joseph	specifically	mentioned	his	employer	and	thus	the	comments	could	be	reasonably	perceived	as	affecting	TeleTech’s	reputation.	In	 summary,	 employers’	 control	 of	 out	 of	 work	 expression	 should	 be	 far	 more	limited	than	work-time	expression.	Restrictions	can	have	a	potentially	extreme	effect	on	freedom	 of	 expression	 and	 considerably	 affect	 an	 employee’s	 autonomy.	 If	 the	expression	 concerns	 a	matter	 of	 public	 debate	 there	 should	 be	 a	 strong	 presumption	that	employees	should	not	be	disciplined	for	such	speech,	even	if	it	is	offensive.	Where	statements	 are	not	 about	 a	matter	of	public	debate,	 such	as	where	abusive	 comments	are	 aimed	 at	 particular	 colleagues,	 as	 in	TeleTech,	the	 presumption	 against	 restricting	freedom	of	expression	is	less	strong,	but	the	general	importance	of	the	right	should	still	be	 considered.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 a	 strict	 dichotomy	 between	 the	 two	 situations.	Some	 cases	 will	 fall	 between	 these	 two	 situations,	 for	 example	 where	 homophobic	comments	 are	made	 about	 the	 introduction	 of	 same-sex	marriage	 to	 a	 gay	 colleague.	Nevertheless,	it	provides	a	starting	point	for	consideration	of	these	issues.		
9.	CONCLUSION		It	 is	 not	 a	 cause	 for	 concern	 that	 discussion,	 consistent	 with	 the	 fact	 of	 a	 pluralist	democracy,	will	 take	place	 in	workplaces	on	controversial	 issues	and	 that	some	of	 the	opinions	expressed	will	cause	offence.	Workplaces	should	not	be	‘sanitised’	or	made	into	‘sterile	zones’.75	Employees	also	cannot	always	be	expected	to	put	their	points	across	in	the	least	offensive	manner.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	employers	must	permit	all	expression:	 it	can	certainly	be	disruptive	and	in	some	cases	employers	must	 intervene	to	prevent	harm	to	other	employees.		The	picture	painted	by	 this	 article	 is	 a	positive	one,	 in	 that	 tribunals	 and	 courts	have	taken	the	demands	of	freedom	of	expression	into	account	when	considering	these																																																									75	Schultz	n	27	above.	
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issues.	 However,	 difficulties	 remain,	 particularly	 regarding	 unfair	 dismissal	 claims.	 As	Collins	and	Mantouvalou	point	out,	domestic	law	merely	requires	freedom	of	expression	to	be	taken	into	account	in	a	consideration	of	reasonableness.	It	does	not	start	from	the	position	that	any	interference	with	freedom	of	expression	must	be	justified.	It	therefore	seems	 likely	 that,	 while	 the	 narrow	 issue	 in	 Redfearn	has	 been	 addressed,	 cases	 will	continue	 to	 arise	which	question	how	much	protection	 should	be	 given	 to	 freedom	of	expression	within	employment.				
